Behavioral Analysis Part 2

Warning Signs to Look for in Violent Extremism/Active Killer incidents.

Following on from what was discussed, in order to deeply understand how these incidents occur, we need to understand the differences between the radicalization and recruitment processes that enlist Homegrown Violent Extremists and Active Killer incidents.

Radicalizing Homegrown Violent Extremism (HVE).
Radicalization of HVAC is the process of developing extremist beliefs, emotions, and behaviors. The extremist beliefs are profound convictions opposed to the fundamental values of society, the laws of democracy and universal human rights, advocating the supremacy of a particular group (racial, religious, political, economic, social etc.).

The result of radical interpretations of mainstream religious or political doctrines of these extreme views tends to justify, promote, incite, or support violence to achieve any number of social, religious, or political changes. This is also referred to as the desensitization of radical theories. The radicalization process creates a sense of new social norms and violent ideation for an individual.

A homegrown violent extremist (HVE) is a person of any citizenship who lives or operates primarily in the United States or its territories and who advocates, engages in, or is preparing to engage in or support terrorist activities in furtherance of a foreign terrorist organization’s objectives, but who acts independently of foreign terrorist direction. Because HVAC are acting to further the goals of a foreign terrorist organization, they are considered foreign intelligence threats under the authorities of the intelligence community and domestic public safety entities.

Behavioral indicators of violent extremist mobilization are observable behaviors that could help determine whether individuals or groups are preparing to engage in violent extremist activities, such as conducting an attack or travelling overseas to join a foreign terrorist organization. Indicators are grouped by diagnosticity—meaning how clearly, we assess the behavior that demonstrates an individual’s likelihood of engaging in terrorist activity or lone actor attacks.

Some common characteristics or clearly defined traits (though not all-inclusive) may be indicated in simple comparisons of people who are more open to terrorist recruitment and radicalization tend to:

• Feel angry, alienated, or disenfranchised.
• Believe that their current political involvement does not give them the power to effect real change.
• Identify with perceived victims of the social injustice they are fighting.
• Feel the need to take action rather than just talking about the problem.
• Believe that engaging in violence against the state is not immoral.
• Have friends or family sympathetic to the cause.
• Feeling withdrawn or an outcast from society.
• Believe that joining a movement offers social and psychological rewards such as adventure, camaraderie, and a heightened sense of identity.

These characteristics are valuable indicators of an individual that a company’s HR departments or educational system can use when evaluating an individual(s) work or school performance.

Once an individual achieves radicalization and recruitment, they are now transitioning to the mobilization of violent acts. Below are the behavioral categories associated with violent mobilization indicators:

Preparation – The process of developing and displaying the act to commit violence.

Motivation – The process of developing and displaying a mindset oriented toward committing a violence.

Concealment – Hiding violent act-related activities from scrutiny.

During this process for each category, the individual will show a gradual increase in commitment to mobilization, which could occur within weeks or months prior to the deployment of the mission.

Domestic terrorism, in general, has many motivations depending on the special interests of the individual or organizations, ranging from radical ideation to other forms of extreme doctrines.

Terrorist Planning Cycle:
The Four (4) critical areas of the planning cycle to observe suspicious behaviors or potential terrorist activities prior to deployment are highlighted below:

• Initial Surveillance
• Final Target Selection
• Pre-Attack Surveillance, and…
• Rehearsal (Dry runs)

The four critical areas are the best point of disruption toward a potential attack as they are viewed as the most vulnerable to detection prior to mission deployment.

The Exception – Escape and Exploitation
Suicide bomber(s) do not care about dying, imprisonment, or torture at the time of their attack. Because of this, there is no need for an escape plan. Suicide bombers want to impact human life or infrastructure significantly and are willing to die for it.

Pre-Attack Operations:
During pre-attack preparation, terrorist activities are most vulnerable to detection and can best be halted. Depending on the scope of the attack, preparation may occur over a period of months and, in some cases, years. During this time period, observable behaviors and activities before a terrorist attack generally represent the best opportunity to detect and disrupt the HVE’s plans. It is equally important to know that all pre-attack operations do not rigidly follow the eight steps of this process, depending on the extent or lack thereof, can fluctuate in time or process.

Prior studies and examination of behaviors that resulted in a disrupted terrorist attack revealed a cycle of planning and preparation that could provide indicators for preventing similar attempts. The terrorist attack planning cycle is not a static, linear process but could begin in several stages with variances in details, sequence, and timing. An individual’s mobilization to violence often provides observable behavioral indicators such as pre-attack surveillance, training, and rehearsal. These indicators potentially allow third-party observers and law enforcement to identify individuals moving to violence, circumstances that may allow for disruption of planned attacks.

Not all acts of terrorism can be prevented. Maintaining vigilance and situational awareness and observing for anomalous behaviors within your environment, we maximize our opportunities to identify a potential threat and the ability to prevent a possible situation by initiating a plan of action.

Lone-Actor/Active Killer (NON-Homegrown Violent Extremism)
Not every active killer situation is domestic terrorism. We hear about people after investigations that had a particular grievance that exceeded their rational coping capabilities that were not associated with extreme ideologies.

We hear about incidents that witnesses say “the writing was on the wall”, or they’re not surprised about “that person”. This is because most of these people saw something that seemed off or not correct. These people did not recognize the signs or believe they saw a possible threat. Most people in past study cases stated that they were hesitant to report concerning behaviors to management or authorities because they feared getting someone in trouble. Most of the time, people could not articulate what seemed “off” or made them feel uncomfortable to say something at all.

There is not one specific warning sign or behavior that is shown. Most active shooters have about 3.5 behavioral stressors at the time of the shooting. It is important to know that people do not just “snap”.  There are observable behavioral cues displayed anywhere, between days, weeks, or even months before an attack. Studies also show that at the beginning of an individual’s grievance, at one time or another, some of the behavioral stressors were displayed during the person’s behavioral change.

Some Common Motives an individual can experience: (not all inclusive)

• Extreme anger or disgust.
• Perception of being persecuted (wronged).
• Quest for justice (as defined by the offender).
• Revenge for a perceived grievance.
• Paranoid or extreme ideation.
• Desire to solve a problem perceived to be unbearable.
• Depressed mood.
• Antisocial or narcissistic traits.
• Major loss of relationship or employment.
• Preemptive strike.
• Magnify and incubate insults.
• Extremization of blame.
• Desire for notoriety or recognition.
• Desire to kill or be killed.

When a person of concern for targeted violence cannot resolve the negative emotional burden of unachieved justice, he could then progress to violent ideation: the idea that violence is an acceptable, or even the only, means of achieving justice. Unable to shake off a grievance and its accompanying anger, despair, humiliation, or other negative emotional responses, the person of concern may eventually conclude that violence is justified, necessary, and his only choice. The adoption of this idea can be profoundly relieving, almost like a salve on a wound. For this reason, a sudden turnaround by a formerly angry, depressed, or menacing person of concern should not be presumed as good news.

Pre-Attack Behaviors of an Active Killer – Six Steps to the Pathway of Violence:

GRIEVANCE –
Bad experience or feel that they have been wronged. There are two parts to this: 1- Factual; that this has actually occurred, and 2- Perceived; without factual evidence or exaggeration of one’s self-interpretation of the situation. At this point, it becomes a fixation and a needing for resolution. The individual loses the ability of self-soothing and to process the situation rationally.

IDEATION –
Becomes Obsessed. The grievance or situation consumes their life. Individuals start fantasizing violent acts or interest in previous acts of violence.

RESEARCH & PLANNING –
This includes generalized target or initial target selection. Once a person of concern decides that violence should, or must, be used to seek justice for real or perceived wrongs, under most circumstances he must then begin to think and plan. The person of concern then considers when, how, and where to offend. He can craft and refine his plan by researching methods, the planned target, past offenders, and previous targeted violence incidents. The person of concern may consider both practical and symbolic reasons when selecting potential targets. As with other steps along the pathway, research and planning need not cease when the next step begins; it can and may comingle with other steps.

PREPARATION –
This includes final target selection; The person of concern may acquire the equipment, skills, and/or any other resources necessary to conduct the attack. This can include obtaining weapons and gear as well as familiarization
of and practice with the weapons. The person may conduct an actual or virtual rehearsal of any aspect of the attack (e.g., driving the intended route to the site). It can also include farewell writings or other end of life planning, or creation of artifacts meant to be left behind to claim credit and explain the motive.

BREACH –
This is the point of no return; This step involves circumvention of security measures or boundaries at the target location. Breach activities can include conducting dry runs, engaging in approach behaviors to include stalking, and testing security at the target location. This definition could be expanded to include cyber intrusion behaviors where these breaches may be intended to identify security plans and weaknesses, gain protected information about a target, or otherwise further an attack plan via unauthorized access to systems. Breach behavior may occur immediately prior to an attack, or earlier.

ATTACK –
Physically conducting the act of violence; An offense may involve violence against both preplanned and opportunistically chosen targets. Both practical and symbolic acts may occur. The violent offense is the culmination of a highly personalized quest for justice which may, ultimately, only be fully understandable to the offender.

Like the Terrorist Planning Cycle, critical points in the process make the individual more susceptible to detection and vulnerability.

Six steps to the Pathway of Violence: Detection Vulnerability

1. Grievance
2. Ideation
3. Research & Planning
Phase 1 – Physical Action
4. Preparation
Phase 2 – Physical Action
5. Breach
Phase 3 – Physical Action
6. Attack
Phase 4 – Physical Action

Conclusion:
We are just beginning to see the possible implications of the pandemic isolation and the results of the uprising of online radicalization and recruitment to the most vulnerable and susceptible individuals that are manipulated or encouraged to act out violently toward our society and our way of life.

Our nation’s youth are at risk of online radicalization and recruitment like never before. They are by far the largest demographic being targeted by extremists, especially online. It is, therefore, our duty to protect them. Prioritized attention to the generation under 30 years old (digital natives across race, religion, ethnicity, location, socioeconomic levels, ideology, and gender) is required to prevent violent ideologies from influencing this segment of our population.

Instead of waiting for an incident to happen, becoming more proactive is the responsibility of all individuals and organizations. By changing the culture from being dependent on government entities to involving more public partnerships from corporations to small businesses to community outreach programs, we have a shared responsibility to be more proactive and to protect our most valuable resource: family, friends and neighbors that make us who we are as a society.

Sources:
Pathway to Violence: Fredrick Calhoun & Steve Watson, Contemporary Threat Management – 2003. Pre-Attack Behaviors: Federal Bureau of Investigation – Behavioral Analysis Unit World Internet Penetration Rate: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
Active Shooter Incidents/Statistics – Open-Source Information: NBC, ABC, CBS, FOX, CNN. All other public media outlets.

 

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Behavioral Analysis Part 2
By Craig Burns

Craig A. Burns is the President and CEO of TACT Consulting, LLC, a behavioural detection and analysis company that specializes in pre-attack behaviours of an active killer, behavioural threat assessment, situational awareness training and public/special events in high-risk venues such as political events, parades, and concerts and sports entertainment.

He has 25 years of experience in private and public sectors, specializing in security operations and physical security with multiple corporate 500 companies and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Transportation Security Administration Behavioral Analysis, Threat Assessment Division. Craig Burns has held positions with the National Training Team assigned out of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) as a Behavior Detection Supervisor.