In this article, I’ll take a look at artificial intelligence, particularly the machine learning area, a basic overview of how it works, and the dangers of over-reliance on an algorithmic approach to analysis.
The first two of these tenets involve soft skills which are sometimes referred to as Protective Intelligence (PI) and include situational and tactical awareness skills (route analysis and surveillance detection). The third tenet, Defend, requires hard skills such as the use of firearms and security driving. These hard skills may be required if we were unable to prevent or avoid an attack, and we end up in a situation where we have to survive an ambush. Continuing where we left off in Part One, we will finish covering some of the soft skills involved in Protective Intelligence and then move on to discuss the hard skills.
It often comes as a surprise just how much is available, and the nefarious uses it can be put to. OSINT can be applied towards defensive purposes, but we will be looking only at malicious purposes. One of the biggest challenges of OSINT is not merely recognising it as a threat, but encouraging the behavioural change needed to protect against it widely enough. It is not enough simply for a principal to stop posting Instagram pictures of their travels in order to hide them – their colleagues, friends, family, and employees also need to be aware of the need to take care with information which could be misused.
Social media can quickly become all things to all people meaning that one can find exactly what they’re looking for at any time, anywhere, and at the stroke of a key, or swipe of a computer screen. However, the technology can also work against you when someone is negligent in their use or management of it.
With funding from the UK’s innovation agency, Innovate UK, Zircon Software Ltd is working to find out whether security surveillance systems and associated analytics can work in a station environment without disrupting the rail network. To achieve this, Zircon are planning to utilise advanced video analytics, taking functional open source Machine Learning libraries wrapped in […]
We all hear about this OSINT malarkey but searching the Internet for information is much much more than just dropping a couple of search terms into Google.
There are many different search engines out there and using these various systems, combined with how you actually search for phrases, should bring you the results you are after.
An estimated 5.9 million CCTV cameras were in operation throughout the UK in 2016, making the British public one of the most surveilled in the world. Only Beijing has more CCTV cameras than London, where the average person will be recorded on camera 300 times in one day.
The hacking of Mr. Bezos is particularly sensitive because of his ownership of The Washington Post, which had published coverage critical of the kingdom and had retained Jamal Khashoggi
Welcome to a third article in the series looking at introductions to cyber security. We’ll be looking at a type of attack which most people will be familiar with in principle, if not in technical practice.
The basic idea is simple – an attacker sits between two trusting parties, intercepting their communication and impersonating each to the other. Obviously this is somewhat harder in practice where people are, for example, sitting in a room together, but even a phone call gives potential for an eavesdropper or impersonator.
In part two of this article on anti-surveillance we shall look at anti-surveillance measures carried out when mobile in a vehicle or on public transport. We shall also look at the various times that a target or person will conduct anti-surveillance measures or drills in order to detect surveillance
Remember that anti-surveillance is defined as the actions that a person would take or do, in order to detect if surveillance is present. The person is aiming to draw the surveillance in by generating two things; multiple sightings and unnatural behaviour. As with our foot anti surveillance drills, when mobile in a vehicle, these drills can also be covert and subtle or overt where it obvious to the followers what you are doing. Again, a number of drills have to be carried out in order to identify surveillance. Just looking behind you does not identify surveillance – it identifies those who are behind you.